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ABSTRACT Qinghai is one of China’s poorest provincial-level jurisdictions, least
internally integrated and least integrated with the rest of the People’s Republic. Its
social complexity and fragile environment repeatedly created significant political and
economic problems during the first half-century of the PRC, which were then
exacerbated by policies that rapidly proved over-simplistic and counter-productive.
Since January 2000 the PRC government’s new policy initiative to develop the
Western Region – the call to “Open Up the West” – has provided the provincial
leadership with the opportunity to resolve some of the province’s long-term
difficulties through adopting markedly different perspectives on development. A more
gradual approach has emerged, concentrating on the development of the province’s
infrastructure and environmental sustainability. Nevertheless, there remains a danger
that in concentrating on economic solutions to the province’s problems its inherent
political, social and cultural contestations may be ignored to the detriment of the
leadership’s wider goals.
During the 1980s and 1990s Qinghai achieved the dubious distinction of
becoming the provincial-level jurisdiction with the worst economic per-
formance in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).1 In 1978 Qinghai had
been a wealthy (in relative terms) middle-income province, with annual
GDP per capita well in excess of the national average (112.9 per cent).
By 1994 it had become one of the lowest income provincial-level
jurisdictions, with just over two-thirds of the national average (68.8 per
cent).2 Economic growth was even slower for the two-thirds of the
provincial population – 5.23 million people in 2001 – who lived in rural
areas and by 1999, 39 of Qinghai’s 46 county-level jurisdictions had
become officially classified as “poverty stricken” at national or provin-
cial-level.3 Equally as dramatically, by the 1990s the province’s financial
* Research for this article was undertaken in Qinghai during 2001–2003 with the support
of the Australian Research Council. The assistance of Guo Jing, Qinghai Nationalities
Commission, Ma Chengjun, Qinghai Nationalities Institute, and Ma Jianzhong, Qinghai
University is gratefully acknowledged. Neither they nor any of those interviewed in
connection with this project is responsible for any of the views or comments expressed in this
article.
1. Zhai Songtian (ed.), 2002 nian Qinghai jingji lanpishu jingji xingshi fence yu yuce
(Qinghai 2002 Economic Blue Book Analysis of Economic Conditions and Forecast, 2002)
(Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 2002), p. 312. According to official data, during
1978–94 Qinghai averaged 5% growth per annum in real GDP per capita, compared to Tibet,
the next worst, at 5.8%.
2. Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The
Case of China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 49–52.
3. In general, unless otherwise indicated, statistics for Qinghai are taken from Qinghai
tongji nianjian 2001 (Qinghai Statistical Yearbook 2001) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji
 The China Quarterly, 2004
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Map 1: Qinghai Province
dependence on central government had doubled to four-fifths of bud-
getary expenditure.4
Qinghai’s leadership has positively welcomed the campaign to “Open
Up the West, not least because they see an opportunity to attempt a new
approach to provincial development that might avoid previous problems.5
A long-term central economic problem has been the reliance on central
government investment necessary for the development not only of the
series of “Reform through Labour” camps for which the province has
probably become most well-known, but also of its limited industrial base
and communications infrastructure. In particular, from the mid-1950s on
considerable efforts were put into the development of extraction indus-
tries (salts, oil, non-ferrous metals) in the Qaidam Basin, centred on
Golmud and Delingha,as well as defence installations, such as the testing
site for the PRC’s first atomic and hydrogen bombs.6
footnote continued
chubanshe, 2001); comparative data from Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2001 (China Statistical
Yearbook 2001) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2001); historical data from Guojia
tongjiju zonghesi (ed.), Quanguo ge sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi lishi tongji ziliao huibian
(Collection of Historical Statistical Materials on every Province, Autonomous Region and
Municipality) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1990).
4. Peter Ferdinand, “The economic and financial dimension,” in David S. G. Goodman
(ed.), China’s Regional Development (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 45.
5. For example, “Qinghai zenme yang, Qinghai zenme gan” (“What Qinghai is like and
how it can speed up its development”) in Qinghai ribao (Qinghai Daily), 13 August 2001,
p. 13; and the statement by Zhao Leji, Governor of Qinghai on the opening of the provincial
website, “As Qinghai advances in the world” at http://www.qh.gov.cn.
6. CCTV 11 July 2001 – http://www.cctv.com/english/news/20010711/50267.html.
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Past attempts at development had faltered through a variety of
difficulties. In the 1950s, massive in-migration from other provinces and
the opening of new agricultural land ended in human as well as economic
disaster that underscored the fragility of the environment. In the second
half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s the transfer of entire
enterprises to Qinghai from elsewhere added a further financial burden
rather than establishing a foundation for local economic growth. It also
exposed both Qinghai’s poor communications with the rest of the PRC
and its weak internal integration, problems that similarly undermined the
province’s attempt to attract external investment with new PRC policies
on openness and reform after 1980.
The provincial development strategy adopted during 2000 as part of the
campaign to Open Up the West appears to have recognized the futility of
past “quick fix” solutions to the province’s development. In their place,
it has opted for a more gradual approach that addresses three major
issues: the need for environmental sustainability; greater internal inte-
gration of the province; and the development of better communications
with the rest of the PRC. Necessarily much of the new strategy revolves
around a series of infrastructure projects.
Even though it is clearly too soon to make a balanced assessment of its
impact, the new development strategy certainly appears to present
sounder opportunities for sustained socio-economic development than its
predecessors. All the same, questions remain about the viability of an
approach to development that regards the province’s problems as capable
of almost total economic solution. Since its establishment as a province
of the Chinese state in 1928, Qinghai has been and remains socially
complex with a high degree of political, social and cultural contestation
amongst its local communities. In the first place, the provincial popu-
lation is socially and culturally extremely diverse. Just over half are Han
Chinese (53 per cent) divided almost equally between indigenous Han
peoples and more recent migrants from the PRC. The remainder include
a large number of minority nationalities, of whom the most significant are
the Tibetans (22 per cent), Hui (16 per cent), Tu (4 per cent), Salar (2 per
cent) and Mongols (2 per cent).7
Moreover, within the province it is possible to identify different and
sometimes competing ideas of Qinghai itself, only one of which is
coterminous with the administrative area of the PRC.8 In addition to the
contemporary party-state’s view, there is Qinghai as Sino-centric Xining,
the provincial capital and a long established border post of Empire; the
agriculturally-settled north-east corner of the province (Haidong); the
Tibetan highlands; the Tibetan and Mongolian grasslands; the more
7. “Quansheng zongrenkou wei 5181560 ren” (“The province’s population reaches
5,181,560 people”), in Qinghai ribao, 28 April 2001, p. 1.
8. An obvious point in this context is that most places in Qinghai province have at least
two, and sometimes more names, depending on culture and language. For example, Qinghai
(in Chinese) is also known as Amdo (Tibetan) and Kokonor (Mongolian). Without wishing
to privilege any specific culture and without intending to give offence to any other, all names
will be presented in Chinese pinyin as a matter of convenience.
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recent (since the 1950s) Han Chinese migrant Golmud region; and the
Islamic Hualong and Xunhua counties (known as “lianghua” – the “two
Huas”) the former heartland of Qinghai’s famous Hui warlord Ma Bufang
before 1949. The evidence would seem to suggest that without a provin-
cial cultural development strategy, not least to explain to each of the local
communities where they fit into the bigger picture, there may be severe
challenges not only to the leadership’s economic development goals, but
also to social coherence in Qinghai.
Physical and Social Environment
Qinghai’s physical and social geography explain many of the problems
that have beset its development under the PRC. At 720,000 square
kilometres the province has a relatively large land area (only the Xin-
jiang, Tibetan and Inner Mongolian Autonomous Regions are larger) that
is in the main scarcely inhabited. Among provincial-level jurisdictions it
has the third highest proportion of minority nationalities (46.5 per cent of
the population) even though it is not a designated minority nationality
autonomous region in the PRC’s administrative system. The usual official
explanation of this apparent anomaly is that there is a relatively large
number of minority nationalities in the province – 37 altogether – without
any one being dominant.9 It would also seem likely that the inherent
contestation of Qinghai was and remains a significant factor in that lack
of autonomous regional status. A political and administrative compromise
of a kind has been reached with the establishment of designated
“autonomous” areas of self-government for minority nationalities at
district and county levels. Of its eight district-level administrations only
Xining city and Haidong (in the north-east of the province) are not
designated autonomous areas. Within Xining, one of its three counties is
an autonomous county; and within Haidong district, four of its six
counties are autonomous counties. This situation has led to the descrip-
tion of Qinghai as “a non self governing area of self government.”10
Qinghai is located on the north-east of the Tibetan-Qinghai Plateau
with an average elevation in excess of 3,000 metres above sea level. The
province is named after Lake Qinghai, China’s biggest inland sea, and
hosts the sources of three major rivers: the Yellow River, the Chang
[Yangtze] and the Lancang River which becomes the Mekong. The
province has three major geographical regions: the Qaidam Basin, west of
Lake Qinghai and north of the Kunlun Mountains, which is an extremely
arid area of salt marshes and desert, with the new (extraction industry-
based) urban centre of Golmud; the sparsely inhabited mountainous
plateau of Yushu and Guoluo (at an average in excess of 4,000 metres
above sea-level); and the north-east corner around Xining, and between
9. Chen Yunfeng, Dangdai Zhongguo de Qinghai (Contemporary China’s Qinghai)
(Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991), Vol. 2, p. 316.
10. Interview with Doma Jiabu, Deputy Director, Qinghai Province Nationalities Affairs
Commission, Xining, 31 July 2002.
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Xining and Gansu province to the east, centring on the valleys of the
Huangshui and Huang [Yellow] Rivers.11
Elevation and climate mean that agriculture is largely confined to
Qinghai’s north-east corner, where 67.2 per cent of the provincial popu-
lation live on 2.84 per cent of the land area. Moreover, even here, at an
average elevation of just over 2,000 metres above sea level, the growing
season is only about three months a year. While Xunhua county (on the
Huang River and the border with Gansu) is able to achieve annual yields
of 800 jin per mu, 200 or 300 jin per mu each year at best is more usual
in other counties. The capacity of the north-east corner, let alone the
whole province, to support a large population has thus always been
severely limited. Farming elsewhere is mainly livestock-based, concen-
trating on sheep, yaks and horses, and is often nomadic.
Elevation, climate and distance have also meant that communications
have always been limited, both internally and with the rest of China.
Outside the province’s north-east corner travel has always been difficult,
when possible at all, and many roads are not paved and not maintained.
The main line of communication is the road that goes from Lanzhou (in
neighbouring Gansu) to Xining; from Xining to Golmud (two days’ travel
even in 2003); and then on to Lhasa (four days).
Even within the north-east corner of the province where communica-
tions are better, they were limited for a long time. The Xining–Lanzhou
railway line that connects Qinghai with the rest of the PRC was com-
pleted in 1959, and despite long-held plans has never been extended to
Xinjiang, though a Xining–Golmud line was opened in 1979. A two-lane
highway along the principal axis of communication within the north-east
of the province was an early local project of the PRC, with a system of
paved roads linking the adjoining counties. Even so, a road of any sort
linking Xining with Xunhua and Hualong counties, to the south and east
but still within Haidong district, was not completed until 1972.12 Under
these circumstances it is perhaps little wonder that for others elsewhere in
China Qinghai may be often incorrectly located as “west of Xinjiang,” or
confused with Qingdao, on the Shandong coast.13
Despite its location well within the territorial frontiers of the PRC,
Qinghai remains essentially a border region. Before it became a province
in 1928, all but the area around Xining was undisputedly outside the
direct rule of the Chinese state and was part of Tibetan culture, with
governance left to local clans and monasteries. The north-east corner of
the later province was socially more contested, even though politically it
was part of Gansu province. It had much in common with the southern
part of that province in terms of the mix of cultures to be found there –
Han Chinese, Hui, Tibetan, Mongol, Salar – though Tibetan culture was
11. Qinghai sheng dili (Geography of Qinghai Province) (Xining: Qinghai renmin
chubanshe, 1987); Qinghai shengqing (The Condition of Qinghai) (Xining: Qinghai renmin
chubanshe, 1986), especially pp. 8ff.
12. Chen Yufeng, Contemporary China’s Qinghai, Vol. 1, p. 397.
13. Xu Xiaoren, “Qinghai de yiyun” (“What Qinghai signifies”) in Qinghai ribao, 23
December 2001, p. 3.
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somewhat stronger. Ta’ersi (Kumbum Monastery) just outside Xining is
located where the founder of the Yellow Sect was born in the 14th
century, and has been strongly associated with the Dalai Lamas since a
Mongol Khan conferred the title on Sonam Gyatso in 1578.14 Xining
itself was a long-established border town (back to at least the 12th
century though claims are made to the sixth century15) at the crossroads
between Mongol and Tibetan culture, north to south, and Han Chinese
and Inner Asia Muslim culture, east to west.
These cultural interactions help explain the province’s current social
complexity. The Han Chinese are concentrated in Xining, the north-east
counties of the province and the new urban centre of Golmud. The
Tibetans are the overwhelming majority of the population outside the
north-east corner, but there are even parts of Haidong where they
constitute a significant minority of the population (a quarter, for example
in Xunhua county). The Hui are concentrated in Xining and Haidong
district in the valleys of the Huang and Huangshui Rivers and the hills in
between, and particularly in Minhe, Hualong and Datong counties. The
Tu and Salar nationalities originate in the province. The Tu are said to
have settled in Huzhu county (to the north-east of Xining) with the
Genghis Khan Mongols, and are Tibetan Buddhist having much in
common with the Mongols. The Salar are a Turkic and Islamic people
thought to have migrated from Central Asia to the banks of the Huang
River in today’s Xunhua county in about 1210.16
While the less populous nationalities are relatively homogenous, the
more numerous, especially the Han Chinese and the Tibetans, quite
clearly are not. In broad terms the Han Chinese population are divided
roughly equally between people whose families have been long settled in
Xining and the north-eastern part of the province, and those who have
migrated from the eastern provinces under one or other of the PRC’s
post-1949 campaigns. The former have a distinct local culture and
language.17 They are predominantly Buddhist, and in rural areas have
often adopted Hui and Tibetan lifestyles and customs. In contrast, the
more recent migrants speak Modern Standard Chinese and have brought
with them more of the culture of their various native places. Unlike the
14. Pu Wencheng, Gan-Qing zangzu fojiao siyuan (Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries of
Gansu and Qinghai) (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1990, p. 141). Kumbum also
became associated with the previous (tenth) Panchen Lama, who supported close relations
with China generally before 1949 and with the CCP after 1949. He was a native of Xunhua
county, also in the north-east corner of Qinghai province.
15. Cui Yonghong, Zhang Dezu, Du Changshun (eds.), Qinghai tongshi (A General
History of Qinghai) (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1999), p. 197.
16. Guo Jing, Salazu jianshi (Introductory History of the Salar) (Xining: Qinghai renmin
chubanshe, 1981); Li Xue Wei and Kevin Stuart, “The Xunhua Sala,” Asian Folklore Studies,
Vol. 49 (1990), pp. 39–52. “Tuzu” (“The Tu Nationality”), in Muchi Yundengjiacuo (ed.),
Qinghai shaoshu minzu (Qinghai’s Minority Nationalities) (Xining: Qinghai renmin
chubanshe, 1995), p. 312.
17. Keith Dede, “Language contact, variation and change,” PhD dissertation, University
of Washington, 1999; Gao Fucheng, “Qinghai hanyu fangyan tansuo” (“An exploration of
the Xining local variation of Chinese”), Qinghai minzu yanjiu (Nationalities Research in
Qinghai), No. 3 (2002), p. 109.
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indigenous Han Chinese, a significant proportion of the more recent
migrants live in Golmud and the surrounding area. Moreover, many of
the more recent migrants have come to Qinghai but not with the intention
of staying permanently, so that they might perhaps be better regarded
(and often regard themselves only) as temporary “sojourners” rather than
permanent migrants.
The Tibetans regard themselves as almost inherently divided by class,
settlement, clan and level of integration into Chinese culture.18 Although
the Tibetans of the interior, particularly Yushu and Guoluo, are essen-
tially nomadic, there are both settled and agricultural Tibetans as well as
nomadic pastoralists to be found throughout Qinghai.19 Assimilationalist
policies of various kinds under both the Republic and the PRC before
1980 have meant that many Tibetans in Qinghai, especially but not
exclusively those living in Xining and the north-east corner, do not speak
any Tibetan, and may have only a rudimentary exposure to Tibetan
culture. For those who are less integrated into Chinese culture, clan
affiliation probably remains the most important determination of social
action.20 Moreover, despite the relationship between Kumbum and Lhasa,
and the current Dalai Lama being a native of Ping’an county (just east of
Xining), Tibetans in Qinghai have long regarded themselves as both
socially and politically separate from those in Central Tibet.21 In particu-
lar, the Qinghai region has a reputation for producing the leading Tibetan
intellectuals and artists. Qinghai Tibetans readily acknowledge, and to a
certain extent celebrate, that after the end of the Tibetan (Tubo) Empire
in the ninth century they were never again “ruled by any one leader as a
united people,” and certainly not under Lhasa’s control. 22 Unsurprisingly,
this perspective towards Tibetan Qinghai is not always shared in Lhasa or
by exiled Tibetans.23
Provincial Development
As might be expected in a border region, the area that is now Qinghai
has seen a fairly constant contest for political and cultural space. Some-
times this has resulted in open conflict, sometimes co-operation, and
sometimes integration among the differing peoples and cultures of the
region. Certainly contestation lay at the heart of the province’s establish-
ment and early development. While the establishment of Qinghai as a
province in 1928 resulted in part from considerations of Republican Era
18. Muchi Yundengjiacuo, Qinghai’s Minority Nationalities, p. 187.
19. Qinghai sheng renkou pucha bangongshe (ed.), Qinghai Zangzu renkou (Qinghai’s
Tibetan Population) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994), p. 23.
20. Li Zonghua and Li Yanqi, Anduo zangzu shilu¨e (Brief History of the Tibetans of Amdo)
(Xining: Qinghai minzu chubanshe, 1992).
21. A Doak Barnett, China’s Far West: Four Decades of Change (Boulder: Westview,
1993), p. 290.
22. Samten G Karmay “Amdo, one of the three traditional provinces of Tibet,” Lungta,
No. 2 (1994): The Amnye Machen Range – Ancestor of the Tibetans, p. 3.
23. Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since
1947 (London: Penguin, 1999).
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politics that were unrelated to matters on the ground in the region, the
pressure for provincial status also came from local Hui leaders who were
committed to the development of a separate Sino-Muslim identity in
China’s north-west that had its own political representations.24 Prominent
amongst these local leaders was Ma Qi, the Qing Dynasty loyalist
military commander of Xining. Eventually appointed as governor by the
Republican government, leadership of Qinghai passed on his death in
1931 in name to his brother but increasingly in fact to his son, Ma
Bufang, who eventually replaced his uncle formally and led the province
until 1949. Ma Bufang established essentially a separate, and Islamic,
state-within-a-state in Qinghai under the Republic. He relied heavily on
the Hui and Salar, recruiting military officers almost exclusively from
Hualong and Xunhua counties (excluding Tibetans and Mongols from his
army) and civilian officials from Ledu and Minhe counties 25 While he
was restrained in his opposition to Han Chinese generally, he was
virulently anti-communist, and undertook a campaign of ethnic cleansing
amongst the Tibetans in the north-east and eastern fringes of the prov-
ince.26
Qinghai was then in 1949 already a site of considerable contestation,
and presented some particularly difficult political problems. In the first
place the CCP had only a small and limited organization in the prov-
ince.27 Moreover, the new regime underestimated the extent of opposition
to Beijing, not only from the Islamic Hui and Salars, but also from the
Tibetans. They mistakenly believed the Tibetans would welcome the CCP
because it had defeated Ma Bufang. In the event, sporadic armed resist-
ance continued throughout most of the 1950s.28
The strategy for the rapid development of Qinghai, adopted at the
provincial CCP Congress in 1956, was to establish an industrial base in
Xining, to open up the Qaidam Basin for extraction industries, and
essentially to change the population mix through expansion both there
and in the north-eastern corner of the province with massive migration
from the eastern provinces. Some 176,000 people were brought into
Qinghai during 1956 alone, and altogether more than 700,000 (or a third
of the then provincial population) were migrated in during 1956–59.29
24. Jonathan Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). M. Hunsberger, “Ma Pu-fang in Chinghai
province,” PhD dissertation, Temple University, 1978, pp. 31ff details the politics that led to
the establishment of Qinghai province.
25. Yang Xiaoping, Ma Bufang jiazu de xingshuai (The Rise and Fall of the Ma Bufang
Clan) (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1986); Chen Binyuan, Ma Bufang jiazu tongzhi
Qinghai sishi nian (The Ma Bufang Clan’s 40 Years of Rule in Qinghai) (Xining: Qinghai
renmin chubanshe, 1986, revised ed.).
26. Cui Yonghong (ed.), Ma Bufang zai Qinghai 1931–1949 (Xining: Qinghai renmin
chubanshe, 1994), pp. 71ff.
27. There were 3,121 CCP members in Qinghai in 1954, in Qinghai ribao, 23 September
1954, p. 1.
28. Chen Yufeng, Contemporary China’s Qinghai, Vol. 1, pp. 46–50; Zhang Pu, Jia Dawu
and Guo Jing, Dangdai Qinghai jianshi (Brief History of Contemporary Qinghai) (Beijing:
Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1996), p. 149–166.
29. Sangjiejia (ed.), Qinghai baike quanshu (Qinghai Encyclopedia) (Beijing: Zhongguo
baike quanshu chubanshe, 1998), p. 42.
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Through reclaiming wasteland and opening up new farmland the goal was
to have 10 million people in Qinghai by 1967.30
The plan for migration-led development went badly awry from the
start. Already in 1956 as the policy was being announced publicly it was
acknowledged that the migrants from the east were often reluctant to
settle. Conditions were far from ideal and far from what they had been led
to expect. Many of the migrants left the land and either returned to their
previous homes or streamed into Xining.31 There was also considerable
resistance from the local indigenous peoples, regardless of nationality,
which was exacerbated by the CCP’s campaigns for rural socialization
that were being implemented simultaneously. In the middle of 1958, two
different movements of resistance joined forces. Han Yimu, a Salar and
former soldier with Ma Bufang who had evaded capture in 1952, raised
the flag of revolt in Xunhua, as did the Tibetans in pastoral areas affected
by collectivization.32
Having put down the attempted rebellion, the CCP’s political response
was to push on with the Great Leap Forward and to increase migration
and land reclamation still further during 1959 and 1960, under the slogans
of “take reclamation as the key link” and “turn the pastoral area into an
important agricultural base.” The attempt proved even more disastrous:
Qinghai’s altitude and climate meant that pastures frequently could not
support crop production and were simply turned into wasteland.33 This
time alienating the local indigenous peoples was a lesser problem.
Agricultural and industrial production in Qinghai declined dramatically
and there was a massive famine that resulted in a death rate in excess of
four per thousand in 1960 (only Guizhou and Anhui suffered more as a
result of the Great Leap34) and the exodus from the province of some
570,000 people during 1960–63.35
The failure of mass migration to achieve the goal of a measure of
social control, and indeed having exacerbated the situation, led the
provincial leadership to more straightforward measures in the early
1960s. It carried out a series of localized terror campaigns that resulted
in large numbers of local leaders, especially Hui, Salar and Tibetans,
being sent to “Reform through Labour” camps for political crimes, and
often merely on suspicion of opposition to the regime.36 Essentially
assimilationist policies were pursued, and almost all local activity that
could be associated with specific minority nationalities was at first
discouraged and then in the Cultural Revolution not allowed at all.
Education, for example, was now to be conducted exclusively in Modern
30. Chen Yufeng, Contemporary China’s Qinghai, Vol. 1, p. 85.
31. Henry G Schwarz, “Chinese migration to northwest China and Inner Mongolia,
1949–1959,” The China Quarterly, No.16 (1963), p. 68.
32. Chen Yufeng, Contemporary China’s Qinghai, Vol. 1, p. 92; Zhang, Jia and Guo, Brief
History, p. 150.
33. Chen Yufeng, Contemporary China’s Qinghai, Vol. 1, p. 89.
34. Dali L. Yang, Calamity and Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1996), pp. 33ff.
35. Sangjiejia, Qinghai Encyclopedia, p. 42.
36. Zhang, Jia and Guo, Brief History, pp. 166–170.
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Standard Chinese, with no allowance made, at least officially, for min-
ority nationality languages. “Re”-settlement programmes for nomads
were introduced together with continued land use that discriminated
against pastoralists. Places of religious worship were heavily restricted,
and later were closed altogether.
Despite the failures of the Great Leap, migration and the industrial
development of Qinghai remained on the CCP’s agenda throughout the
era of the Cultural Revolution. This time, however, the emphasis was on
the movement of whole industrial plants as part of the PRC’s Third Front
strategy of defence industrialization,37 though the strategy was no more
successful. While industrialization continued in the Qaidam Basin, some
45 enterprises and their staff were moved to the Xining area alone,
mainly from Shanghai and Shenyang.38 On paper the investment was
impressive: some 2 billion yuan in fixed assets was invested across the
provincial economy in this way. Unfortunately, the costs of production
and transport were also high and the returns to the economy were low.
The investment produced only a total increase in industrial output of 700
million yuan during 1965–76.39 Again, migration from China’s east was
largely unsuccessful in attracting permanent settlers. While there was
significant in-migration during the Cultural Revolution, at the rate of
100–150,000 people a year, it was for the most part balanced by the
numbers of those leaving over the same period.40
In the early 1980s the legacy of the Cultural Revolution in Qinghai
rapidly came under criticism as PRC politics moved to embrace polices
of reform and openness. In particular, the repression of national minori-
ties during the late 1950s, the early 1960s and throughout the Cultural
Revolution was denounced as “leftist excess” and those who had been
imprisoned without having been directly involved in the earlier attempted
uprisings were cleared of criminal accusations and released back into
their communities.41 At the same time, considerably greater freedom of
local cultural and religious expression was once again permitted, and
even to some extent encouraged, throughout the province. If slowly at
first, mosques, temples and monasteries were re-opened and revived.
Starting in 1982 a new system of minority nationality education was
introduced, where instruction was undertaken in the specific language of
each nationality, though Modern Standard Chinese was also learnt. By
1985, there were 15 such colleges, 49 secondary schools and 1,423
primary schools, with the majority in Tibetan areas. Six women-only
secondary schools were also established to meet the demands of local
Muslims in Hui and Salar areas for gender separation in education.42
The economic legacy of the Cultural Revolution in Qinghai was a
37. Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: defence industrialization in the Chinese interior,”
The China Quarterly, No. 115 (September 1988), p. 351.
38. Zhang, Jia and Guo, Brief History, p. 214.
39. Chen Yufeng, Contemporary China’s Qinghai, Vol. 1, p. 104.
40. Qinghai tongji nianjian 2001, p. 35.
41. Zhang, Jia and Guo, Brief History, p. 261.
42. Chen Yufeng, Contemporary China’s Qinghai, Vol. 2, p. 335.
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series of not very productive industrial enterprises and a massive and
increasing debt in government expenditure. All but a few of the prov-
ince’s enterprises looked likely to suffer terminally from the weakness of
the provincial infrastructure, including a poor education system, and the
lack of adequate communications with the rest of the PRC. In most cases
production costs were too high to justify any activity economically. In
addition, the high factor costs and the lack of appropriate infrastructure
were to prove a massive disincentive to external involvement. Remark-
ably, no joint ventures involving foreign equity were established in
Qinghai at all during the 1980s.43 Under these circumstances, the poor
performance of the provincial economy during the first two decades of
the reform era is no surprise.
Opening Up the West
The need for a new development strategy in Qinghai under the PRC’s
new (Tenth) Five-year Plan (for economic and social development)
scheduled to be introduced in 2001 was acute. Quite apart from its poor
economic performance during the 1980s and 1990s, in 2000 alone
industrial output had fallen by 4 per cent on the previous year.44 In his
2001 Government Work Report the provincial governor emphasized the
extent of crisis:
… the foundations of agriculture and animal husbandry are fragile, the process of
industrialization is slow, the level of development of the secondary and tertiary
sectors is comparatively low, there are few new economic growth points, and there
are no reserves for further economic development [moreover] the provincial budget
has a serious problem, with its increasing revenue not keeping pace with expenditure
on a grand scale, so that there are many debts everywhere.45
Unremarkably, in the light of such comments, the provincial leadership’s
response included a plea for central government financial assistance for
the Qinghai current account, which Beijing has continued to support.46
However, more fundamental has been the change in the province’s
strategy that has seen a commitment to a more gradual approach to
development that encourages environmental sustainability, the improve-
ment of the province’s internal infrastructure, and the establishment of
good communication links with the rest of the PRC. 47 By the end of 2001
43. Barnett, China’s Far West, p. 312.
44. Zhai Songtia, Qinghai 2002 Economic Blue Book Analysis, p. 328.
45. Zhao Leji, “Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” (“Government work report”), in Qinghai ribao,
27 January 2002, p. 1.
46. In 2001, central government provided just over 80% of the provincial government’s
budget, including 5 billion yuan for general expenditure, 3 billion yuan earmarked funds for
the minority nationalities’ areas, and some 3 billion yuan as salary supplementation to
employees of the party-state.
47. “Qinghai sheng guomin jingji he shehui fazhan shiwu jihua gangyao” (“Outline of
Qinghai province’s five-year economic and social development plan for the national
economy”), 10 January 2001, and Zhao Leji “Guanyu Qinghai sheng guomin jingji he shehui
fazhan shiwu jihua gangyao de baogao” (“Report on the outline of Qinghai province’s
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the central government had already committed 20 billion yuan in support
of provincial infrastructure projects to these and other ends.
It seems likely that some of the planning for this change of direction
and rhetoric was already under way before 2000, although these were not
made public until after January 2000 and the more formal announcement
of the programme to Open Up the West. Work had, for example, already
started on some specific projects such as the Xining–Lanzhou expressway
beforehand. Also, some of the principles of Qinghai’s 1950’s develop-
ment strategy had already been long abandoned. Most notably there had
been some understanding of the need for an approach based on principles
of sustainable development already in the mid-1980s. A new population
policy was adopted in 1986, when the programme of attempting to attract
eastern province migrants to Qinghai was finally abandoned. Since that
time, the growth in Qinghai’s population has been tightly controlled, with
Han Chinese subject to a one-child policy and minority nationalities
limited to no more than two children.48 As a result, population growth in
Qinghai has been remarkably constant since 1990 at around 12–14 per
cent a year.49
Nevertheless, the extent of change in Qinghai’s development outlook is
at its greatest in the contrast between the emphasis until 2000 on mineral
extraction from the Qaidam Basin, and the new catch-phrase (coined by
Jiang Zemin) to “Open Up the West through rebuilding a green west.”
The provincial leadership has embraced the concepts of ecology and
environmental sustainability, which are now the starting point not only
for the new Five-year Plan but also in many specific policy areas.50 More
narrowly, there have been two distinct aspects to the new programme of
“re-greening.” One has been the creation of environmental protection
areas, the other a large-scale programme of farmland retirement, pastoral
restoration and afforestation.
Presumably the recent water shortages on the Huang River and floods
on the Chang have drawn the attention of Beijing to potential problems
in these river systems at their source.51 Certainly there has been cause for
concern: in a recent survey it was found that about half the lakes to be
found in the Huang River’s source catchment area had dried up.52 The
response by the provincial government has been the creation of a Three
footnote continued
five-year economic and social development plan for the national economy”), 10 January 2001,
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48. Zhongguo renkou: Qinghai fence (China’s Population: Qinghai Volume) (Beijing:
Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1989), p. 213; Sangjiejia, Qinghai Encyclopedia, p. 43.
49. Qinghai tongji nianjian 2001, p. 33.
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resources construction”), Qinghai ribao, 13 May 2001, p. 1.
51. Wang Ying, “State focuses on green mapping,” China Daily, 10 March 2001.
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Rivers Sources Preservation Area of 220,000 square kilometres across
Yushu and Guoluo, the locations of the sources of the Huang River,
Chang River and Lancang River, where land usage is to be more closely
regulated. Similarly, in response to studies that showed increased salin-
ization on the shores of Lake Qinghai through over-cultivation, the
provincial government established a Lake Qinghai Environmental Protec-
tion Area that severely limits agricultural production in the area.53
The change in policy to encourage the return of farmland to pasture
and afforestation is even more remarkable because of its associations with
the contest for political space in Qinghai. Though in most cases the
transformation of pasture to farmland was almost certainly only ever
marginal where indeed it was not actually economically counter-produc-
tive, the practice continued as part of the attempted population expansion,
even after the policy of mass migration ended. While the Han Chinese
and the Hui are predominantly agriculturalists, the pastoralists are either
Tibetan or Mongol. Inappropriate land usage and management by 2000
had resulted in widespread soil erosion, desertification and the reduction
of water resources, as well as severe declines in average livestock sizes.54
The provincial government has developed and started to implement a
“Provincial ecology environmental construction plan” that focuses on
farmland retirement and afforestation.55 In 2000 and 2001, 500,000 mu of
farmland was returned to forest and grassland in an experimental 16
counties.56 From 2002 it is planned to plant 2.27 million mu to trees and
grass in the Qaidam Basin (where desertification has been most severe)
and to retire a further 1.8 million mu of farmland to forest and grass-
land.57 A massive afforestation programme has been adopted, not least
because it has been calculated that Qinghai lost about 3 million mu of
trees between 1911 and 2000, a period in which farmland increased from
3.4 to 8 million mu. To manage this programme, the Bureau of Forestry,
previously under the Provincial Agricultural and Forestry Office, has
become a provincial department in its own right.58
The greening of Qinghai in these ways has received financial support
from the central government as one of the ten large-scale infrastructure
projects identified by the State Council as part of the original proposal to
develop the western region at the beginning of 2000.59 Two other
53. “Qinghai jinzhi zai Changjiang Huanghe yuantou qu fangmu” (“Qinghai prohibits
grazing at the sources of the Huang River and the Chang River”), in www.qhnews.com, 17
January 2002.
54. Zhang Shengjie and An Shiyuan, “Shengtai huanjing baohu yu zhili” (“Environmental
protection and management of the ecology”), in Hu Yongke (ed.), Zhongguo xibu gailan:
Qinghai (A Survey of China’s West: Qinghai) (Beijing, Minzu chubanshe, 2000), p. 133.
55. Zhai Songtian, 2002 Qinghai 2002 Economic Blue Book Analysis, p. 228.
56. Wang Baoping, “Qinghai tuigeng huanlin quanmian pukai shengtai huanjinhua dedao
kongzhi” (“Qinghai has started farmland retirement projects on all fronts”), Xining wanbao
(Xining Evening News), 20 January 2002, p. 1.
57. Shen Weizu, “The policy of returning farmland to forest and grassland is to be practiced
in 31 counties in Qinghai this year,” Xihai dushi bao (Western City News), p. 1.
58. Interview with Wei Zhenduo, Senior Forestry Engineer, Provincial Forestry
Department, Xining, 28 December 2001.
59. Interview with Zang Peiyan, in Beijing Review, 29 May 2000.
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large-scale projects in Qinghai were also included in that initial list: the
construction of a natural gas pipeline from Sebei to Xining and then to
Lanzhou; and the development of a large-scale potassic fertilizer plant in
the Qaidam Basin. The extension of the railway from Golmud to Lhasa
– which would then provide communications within the rest of Qinghai,
as well as linking the Tibet Autonomous Region with the PRC rail
network – was a third major project added later in the year.60 These are
all major projects involving not only significant capital investment but
also the large-scale mobilization of human and other resources. The
construction of the new railway from Golmud to Lhasa, for example, is
estimated at current prices to cost in the region of 30 billion yuan, or
about US$3.6 billion, and will be a major feat of engineering, not least
because the track will cross large stretches of permafrost and wetlands.61
As with these very large projects, other smaller projects have been
designed to improve Qinghai’s internal infrastructure and its integration
with the rest of the PRC. The provincial government has established a
special office to attract investment to Qinghai from elsewhere in the PRC
and internationally.62 As already noted, the Xining–Lanzhou expressway
had started construction before the public adoption of the new western
region development strategy. The entire road opened in January 2003, but
the 35 kilometres from Xining to Ping’an county, providing a link to the
provincial airport, was opened in October 2001.63 While this key link
with the rest of the PRC has clearly been given high priority, funds have
also been provided by the provincial government to local authorities to
aid the development of paved roads within Qinghai. Some 171 million
yuan was allocated for 2001 and 2002 as aid to encourage the construc-
tion of paved roads linking all the district centres and county towns.64
While there has clearly been an emphasis on transport and physical
means of communication, new technology has also not been omitted from
consideration. The provincial government established its own website in
2001, if somewhat belatedly by the standards of provinces in the rest of
the PRC, and has highlighted the need to develop widespread internet
access across the province.65
Education has been included as part of the infrastructure that needs
improving, with concerns about both quantity and quality. Only the Tibet
Autonomous Region has worse rates of primary school participation, and
60. “State Council notice on implementing policies and measures to develop west China,”
New China News Agency Report, Beijing, 27 December 2000.
61. “Tibet railway breaks new ground,” Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 8 November 2001.
62. “20 xiang hetong zai Xining qianding jiazhi 23 yi yuan” (“20 contracts signed in
Xining: value 230 million”), Qinghai ribao, 30 July 2001, p. 1.
63. “Pingxi gaosu gonglu feijichang duan yi kaifang” (“Airport section of Ping’an–Xining
expressway open to traffic”), Qinghai ribao, 2 October 2001, p. 1.
64. “Guojia touzi 17.1 yi yuan yongyu wosheng daolu jianshe” (“State invests 1.71 billion
yuan in provincial road construction”), Qinghai ribao, 26 October 2001, p. 1.
65. Jing Hui (ed.), 2002 nian Qinghai shehui lanpishu shehui xingshi fence yu yuce
(Qinghai 2002 Society Blue Book Analysis and Forecast of Social Conditions, 2002) (Xining:
Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 2002), p. 169; Zhang Fayu “Wangluo jingji dui xibu kaifa de
qishi” (“The revelation of the internet economy in the opening of the western region”),
Qinghai shehui kexue (Qinghai Social Sciences), No. 4 (2001), p. 50.
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both childhood and adult literacy, and Qinghai is far beneath the PRC
averages in all those categories. There is concern about the quality of
education being provided to those who do attend the formal education
system, as well as about the tendency for anyone who does succeed in
education to leave the province. Additional investment has been provided
for school education, so that by the end of 2001 there were 5,180 schools,
of which 1,122 were minority nationality schools, with 1.3 million
students (about a quarter of the total provincial population). In order to
improve the technical proficiency of the local workforce, Qinghai has
also been permitted by the central government to have the highest
enrolment rate of students proceeding to tertiary education from the
school system, at 80 per cent.66
Continued development of Qinghai’s established industries in salts,
hydroelectricity, petrol and natural gas, and non-ferrous metals pro-
duction has not been completely abandoned. Indeed, in some cases, as
with potash development and the building of a natural gas pipeline, there
have been commitments to further development. On the other hand, in
some industries and enterprises there has been a clear recognition that
there is no future for continued production. In Minhe county, for exam-
ple, where government revenue has been almost totally derived from the
local ferrosilicon industry, there has for some time been a recognition that
the PRC’s entry into WTO, outdated local technology, and high pro-
duction and transport costs spells the end for the local industry, which
could previously hardly withstand the competition within the PRC.67
New areas highlighted for expansion include tourism, herbal medicines
and township (light) enterprises.68 However, all of these are likely to
remain relatively small-scale, not least because of the climate, the fra-
gility of the environment and poor internal communications within the
province. Tourism is a good example of the problems facing a su-
perficially attractive new industry. Local labour is cheap, the Qinghai
scenery is indeed dramatic, and the plateau beyond the north-east corner
of the province contains not only Lake Qinghai but also some of the
highest mountains in the world. “Safari trips” to the source of the Chang
are frequently advertised in Hong Kong. Even in the north-east corner,
tourists can be attracted through the presentation of the spectacle of the
ethnic mix, including, for example, various monasteries and the birth-
place of the Dalai Lama.69 In this case the difficulties are not so much
transport to Qinghai or even accommodation in Xining, as the difficulties
of moving around the province, including restrictions in protected areas,
66. Interview with Li Weiheng, Deputy Head, Qinghai Department of Education, Xining,
30 July 2002.
67. Interview with Mou Fucai, Deputy Head, Minhe County People’s Government, Minhe,
2 October 2001.
68. Zhai Songtia, 2002 Qinghai 2002 Economic Blue Book Analysis, pp. 219, 238 and 248
provides plans for the development of each new industry.
69. Interview with Ma Xiangdong, Deputy Head, Ping’an County People’s Government,
Ping’an, 1 August 2002.
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and a climate that restricts the tourist season from June to mid-September,
all of which ensures that income from tourism is likely to remain limited.
Impact and Reception
Some commentators outside the PRC have regarded the campaign to
Open Up the West as delivering more in rhetoric than in hard resources.70
This is clearly not the case for Qinghai, even though there remains a
rhetorical dimension to change. While it can be argued that some of the
expenditure committed since the beginning of 2000 would have been
supplied anyway, both because of already planned projects and because
of the need to maintain provincial government expenditure, it is also the
case that the strategic redirection has provided Qinghai with additional
resources it would not otherwise have received. At the same time, the
rhetoric of change has not been negligible in assisting the party-state to
adjust, as the provincial leadership attempts to persuade it and indeed the
local population to abandon policies and practices developed over the
previous four decades.
Reactions within Qinghai to the new strategy have been varied, as
might be expected, ranging from enthusiasm and somewhat unrealistic
optimism, through a more measured scepticism to frank cynicism and
fear for the consequences of change. At one extreme some officials in the
party-state still seem to articulate a stated belief that “the better times are
just around the corner” despite the evidence of provincial government
work reports, and even if the corner is now a 20-year wait rather than a
near instant tomorrow. There are, for example, expectations of external
investment, of jobs to aid unemployment, of a narrowing of the wealth
gap with China’s east, of an improved environment, and that Qinghai will
not always require subsidy from the PRC budget.71
Equally, outside the party-state, and particularly among many non-Han
Chinese communities, there has been a considerable and positive re-
sponse to change. Every minority nationality has seen a marked cultural
and economic revival since 1999, though necessarily reactions have been
far from uniform. Tibetan pastoralists have reacted positively to the
changes in policies and practices on land usage. Hui and Salar traders and
restaurateurs have proliferated across the province, and many of the
province’s larger private economic concerns are those that have origi-
nated with Salar from Xunhua, and Hui from Hualong and Minhe.
At the same time, the project to Open Up Qinghai has not been without
its more sceptical and cynical reactions. As one TV journalist com-
mented:
China’s west is divided into two parts. One is the west with Chongqing at its centre.
The other centres on Xi’an. The former has money and is looking for development
70. See, for example: Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China’s hard sell in the mild, mild west,” CNN,
29 May 2001.
71. These were the most frequently mentioned in interviews with 27 officials of the
party-state interviewed in Qinghai during 2001–2003.
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projects, the latter has projects and is looking for money [and] it’s a shame some
experts on China’s west just came to visit Qinghai for one or two weeks and then
began to make reports and draw up plans. None of them is doing detailed on-the-spot
large-scale study.72
A leading cadre from a provincial government department indicated they
thought the new policy would only “increase people’s tendency to expect,
depend on and beg for the state’s support” while another thought “in the
end the eastern enterprises may benefit more from the development of
Qinghai’s infrastructure” than the province itself.
Most negatively, the new direction in policy has been greeted by
concerns that the new pressures for change threaten local culture. In the
words of one Xining-based researcher: “If is not handled with care, the
western development strategy will cause complaints from local ethnic
minorities who fear that they will probably be assimilated and their
interests invaded.”73 Or, as a Tibetan journalist commented when asked
his view of the impact of the new western development strategy on
Qinghai, “local people are in great danger of losing their ethnic culture,
and it will be difficult to reconstruct moral values.”74
Interestingly, this perception of a threat to culture and civilization is
regarded as a matter of concern not just for and by Qinghai’s minority
nationalities, but also for and by the Han Chinese. One local academic
warned that while the new direction in Qinghai’s development was
desirable, “it will also have its harmful impacts: there will be a rise in
corruption, moral value in certain area of the society will degenerate,
pollution will become more serious.”75 Another, in discussing the impact
of WTO entry as well as the development strategy on Qinghai, com-
mented that they would result in a homogenizing pressure for reform that
would threaten Chinese civilization:
To some degree we should be grateful for such pressure. But as a long-established
civilized country, it is horrible to lose one’s civilization. Such opinion should not be
seen as nationalism or national sentiment. It should be seen as an appropriate feeling
for every Chinese. Therefore, it has become an urgent matter to explore the legacy
of native cultural resources, to make full use of or to preserve native cultural
resources.76
These comments about cultures and civilizations under threat lead back
once again to the issue of contestation, in particular where different ideas
of civilization and different ideas of Qinghai as a place are concerned. Of
course, there is no necessary conflict, or at least no necessary irreconcil-
able conflict, between cultures and communities on either of these
matters. There are after all Hui and Salar businessmen who have
flourished on a large scale in Qinghai under the new development
strategy, and who have been lauded by both the provincial party-state and
72. Zhao Haining, Editor, Western Development television series, Qinghai Satellite TV
Station, interview, Xining, 22 November 2001.
73. Interview, nationalities researcher, Xining, 1 October 2001.
74. Interview, journalist, Xining, 27 May 2002.
75. Interview, historian, Xining, 23 May 2002.
76. Interview, lawyer, Xining, 2 May 2002.
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their own local communities in the process.77 In Tongren the increased
ability for different nationalities to engage in economic and cultural
activities that they regard as appropriate has meant that the county town
has once again become tri-partite with separate centres for the Chinese,
the Muslims (Hui and Salar) and the Tibetans.
All the same, there are clear areas of interaction where different ideas
of life-style and civilization do lead to resistance, opposition and some-
times even conflict. A written script was created for the Salar language in
the early 1980s by the Qinghai Nationalities Institute. This development
was not appreciated by the Salar and the script was just not used: they
prefer to speak in their own Salar language but to write in Chinese for
secular activities and in Arabic for religious purposes. Participation in
primary school education in Qinghai is particularly low for the minority
nationalities, but this is not necessarily because they do not value
education. On the contrary the issue is often that they would prefer a
different kind of education from that offered in the state system. Many
Hui and Salar are unwilling to send their daughters to state schools, not
least because they do not want their daughters educated in mixed sex
classes, and in general regardless of gender they would prefer to send
their children to the religious schools attached to local mosques rather
than to state primary schools. Throughout the predominantly Islamic
counties of Hualong and Xunhua, for example, it is common to see
slogans on walls exhorting the local population to send their children to
state primary schools: “If you want your children to have a tomorrow,
send both the girls and boys to school today!”
Similarly there are likely to be conflicts that emerge over land usage
and patterns of settlement. Farmland retirement has been advocated by
the provincial leadership on grounds of environmental sustainability and
economic efficiency, without apparent regard to the pastoral practices of
the Tibetans and Mongols. Indeed, some of those who have advocated
farmland retirement have also criticized the herdsman, in the words of
one environmentalist, for being “responsible for the deterioration of the
ecology of the grassland, driven by the lure of more cash, and increasing
the uncontrolled number of animals” who then proceeded “to eat the
grass roots and not permit the grasslands to revive.”78
In addition to the conflict over land usage there is also a clash over the
provincial government’s continued policy of settling nomadic herdsmen.
The provincial government’s goal is to settle all nomads by 2011,
claiming to have completed the process experimentally in Hainan district
by the end of 2001.79 The point, according to one provincial official, is
77. For example, two of Qinghai’s wealthiest entrepreneurs: Ma Yisihake (Yitzhak) of the
Xuezhou Woollen Products Group, a Salar from Xunhua county, who heads Qinghai’s largest
private enterprise; and Shi Guotai, a Hui from Hualong County who runs a multi-enterprise
and real estate group now with its headquarters in Xining.
78. Interview with Wei Zhenduo, Senior Forestry Engineer, Provincial Forestry
Department, Xining, 28 December 2001.
79. Wei Xingguo and Jing Fachang, “Hainan mumin quanbu shixian dingju” (“Hainan
herdsmen now live in settlements”), Qinghai ribao, 28 January 2002, p. 1.
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that: “After the nomads settle, they have more protection from natural
disasters and better access to social services. Living in one place has
many advantages and no drawbacks.” This is not necessarily a view
shared by those who are being settled. According to one: “There’s
nothing I’d rather be than a herder. I don’t like cities. I like riding horses
over the grasslands.”80
Nor for that matter is conflict confined to relations between the Han
Chinese and the party-state on the one hand, and the minority nationali-
ties on the other. Tensions remain between some of the communities in
Qinghai and may even have been exacerbated by the differential impact
of the processes of socio-economic change stimulated by the new devel-
opment strategy. For example, as already noted, in Qinghai’s develop-
ment since the 1920s relations between the Hui and the Tibetans have
been characterized more by competition than by co-operation. The new
policy environment has seen the rapid emergence of more and more high
profile Hui businesspeople, restaurateurs and petty traders throughout
much of the province, with the small retail sector now widely regarded as
a Hui domain. Long-term mistrust and the potential for short-term
misunderstanding, especially in commercial transactions, has on several
occasions been a potent mix leading to violence, as erupted in riots in
Jianza during February 2003.81
Managing Change
While it would appear that the prospects for Qinghai’s development
have improved substantially with the call to Open Up the West there
remains a need for caution and perspective in assessing its impact on the
province. Despite the rhetoric of significant change and a desire to narrow
the socio-economic differentials with the eastern seaboard of the PRC,
there remains an underlying reality of economic underdevelopment and
little prospect of the large-scale external investment that would be
required to make a significant difference in line with aspirations. Qinghai
has little industry, limited agricultural capacity, weak infrastructure and
restricted communications with the world outside the province. It is also
likely to be dependant on central government funding for the conceivable
future.
Moreover, even were the major economic problems of development to
prove amenable to solution the process of change management in Qinghai
appears to have omitted an important part of the mix. In other provincial-
level jurisdictions during the 1990s the party-state attempted to manage
some of the consequences of change in development strategy through
appeals to new constructions of community and place.82 While such an
80. Leta Hong Fincher “Nomadic heritage going for a song,” South China Morning Post,
2 August 2001.
81. Reuters report “Tibetans, Muslim Huis clash in China” 23 February 2003,
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/23/china.clash.reut/.
82. Tim Oakes, “China’s provincial identities: reviving regionalism and reinventing
‘Chineseness’,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 3 (August 2000), p. 667; and David
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initiative carried no guarantee of success, or even elite solidarity, as the
cases of Jiangxi and Hubei demonstrated,83 they were nevertheless gener-
ally seen as a necessary part of the process of reform, not least to
legitimize change and to help people understand how they relate to it
individually. Necessarily too provincial leaderships were concerned in
this way to attempt to manage the probable revolution of rising expecta-
tions that often results from a dramatically changed development strategy.
Elsewhere in the PRC these cultural projects were included in planning
for change, and funding set aside for their implementation. From the
available evidence it would seem that nothing similar has as yet been
attempted in Qinghai. A new and imposing provincial museum building
has been built (it opened in 2001) with the help of a Japanese benefactor
(Kojima) in the centre of Xining, yet its exhibits concentrate overwhelm-
ing on the history of Xining itself and of Chinese settlement.
Qinghai’s lack of a cultural development strategy seems particularly
short-sighted since there are quite clearly different ideas of the province
that, while they may overlap and are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
also do not coincide. Political contestation is certainly not as acute as it
was in the 1950s, nor is resentment (of the Chinese state) as great as it
was during the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, the differences that
separate Qinghai’s various communities – particularly the indigenous and
migrant Han Chinese, as well as the Tibetans, Hui, Mongols, Salar and
Tu – cannot be assumed to be of no importance or to be subsumed by a
common sense of purpose. Differences over land usage and tensions over
trading, to take two already-noted examples, are likely to affect the
province’s longer-term prospects for economic development, quite apart
from any equally likely adverse impact on inter-communal relations.
Symptomatically, each community still retains its own icons and sym-
bols, which may themselves be matters of contestation for others. Most
obviously, the province’s Republican-era warlord, Ma Bufang, remains
very much alive in the public consciousness: as a hero for the Hui and
Salar, and quite the opposite for other nationalities.
In comparison to other provincial-level jurisdictions, Qinghai’s leader-
ship is necessarily more restricted by the complex social environment in
its ability to manage ideas of place and community. Moreover, the
formulations of Chinese nationalism generally limit the extent and the
ways that non Han Chinese voices are recognized, and the CCP has
problems in dealing with ethnic or nationality difference other than as a
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function of economic development.84 As a result, the provincial party-
state has clear difficulties in any attempt to go beyond its current focus
on Qinghai as a Xining-centred area of expanding Chinese civilisation.85
A key question for the future of the province is then whether this
conceptualization will remain acceptable to other ideas of place and
community, especially as the latter grow in wealth and self-confidence.
84. For local examples, see: Ren Qizheng, “Lishi de jiaxiang” (“The false appearance of
history”), Qinghai shehui kexue, No. (2001), p. 84; Zhang Liji and Gao Yongjiu, “Minzu
zhijian wenhua chuanbo fangshi chutan” (“A preliminary exploration of the style of cultural
dissemination amongst nationalities”), Qinghai shehui kexue, No. 6 (2001), p. 96.
85. See for example Cui Yonghong, Zhang Dezu and Du Changshun (eds.), Qinghai
tongshi (A General History of Qinghai) (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1999).
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